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Abstract
This paper calculates eﬀective macro-economic tax rates for the 25 EU
countries following the methodology developed in Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar
(1994). The available Eurostat data allow to compute the tax wedge on con-
sumption, labor and capital. We show that eﬀective tax rates in the 10 new
member states of the EU are on average 10 percentage points lower on labor,
and 5 percentage points lower on capital and consumption. There is no ten-
dency of convergence in eﬀective tax burdens on capital. The newly computed
tax rates are in line with the eﬀective tax rates of the EU Commission for EU
15. Eﬀective tax rates on capital are only weakly connected to statutory tax
rates on corporate income. As they are calculated from macroeconomic data
they provide only limited information on the actual tax burdens of individual
corporations or households.
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1 Introduction
The appropriate measurement of tax burdens has recently attracted considerable
attention of policy makers and academics alike. Diﬀerent measures exist. The most
prominent are (i) tax rates, (ii) tax to GDP ratios, (iii) implicit/eﬀective tax rates
on consumption, labor and capital according to Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994),
and (iv) eﬀective ex-ante tax rates according to Devereux and Griﬃth (2003).
Especially in the area of corporate taxation, the debate is vigorous. High tax
rates are claimed to be a sign of high tax burdens, while others argue that the rele-
vant measure is the eﬀective tax rate on capital, while again others argue that the
eﬀective (forward-looking) average tax rates are relevant for investment decisions.
According to the ﬁrst and last measure, Germany is a high tax country, while the
second measure shows that Germany is European average. After EU enlargement,
the debate has gained additional momentum, as the 10 new member states have con-
siderably lower tax rates. However, only few studies compare the diﬀerent measures
of tax burden in the enlarged EU. This is mostly due to the fact that comprehensive
data for the 25 EU countries are missing.
The ﬁrst two measures (tax rates and tax to GDP ratios) are widely used in cross
country empirical research, e.g., Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and Kneller, Bleaney,
and Gemmel (1999). The main advantage of these measures is that they are read-
ily available and easy to compute. Tax rates, however, give no information on tax
exemptions and therefore only partially reﬂect distortions in decision making. Em-
pirical studies nevertheless ﬁnd, that they inﬂuence investment decisions (Buettner
and Ruf 2004). Tax to GDP ratios are diﬃcult to interpret, as taxes are not levied
on GDP and therefore the logical connection of the tax and the tax base, reﬂecting
economic decision making, is absent. This measure nevertheless approximates the
overall tax burden in the economy.
The basic idea of the approach by Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) is to relate
pre- and post-tax prices of goods and thereby to measure the distortion for economic
decision making. Since pre-tax prices are not observable, the tax wedge has to be
approximated by using spending data (i.e. prices times quantities p ∗ q). In this
approach, the tax payment is set in relation to the gross expenditure less the tax
payment. For example, the tax wedge on tobacco products would be measured
as aggregate tax revenue from tobacco taxes in relation to aggregate spending on
tobacco products less the tax revenue.3
Devereux and Griﬃth (2003) further extend the concept of eﬀective average
tax rates for discrete, forward-looking, and mutually exclusive location choices of
multinationals. These choices are shown to depend on eﬀective average tax rates,
which can be measured as a weighted average of the eﬀective marginal tax rate
and an adjusted statutory tax rate. The main advantage of this measure is that it
precisely captures the distortion of the location decision resulting from taxes. It is
forward looking by comparing the post- and pre-tax present value of an investment
product. The computation of this measure is rather complex. Besides detailed
information on tax rates levied on diﬀerent investment assets and sources of ﬁnance,
further information on tax exemption in the home and host country have to be
gathered. In addition, one has to make an estimate of future changes of tax systems.
This represents the main strength and at the same time the main weakness of the
measure. It includes a lot of information, which makes it diﬃcult to compute. In
fact, this measure is not publicly available for all EU 25 countries.1
The present paper contributes to the literature by computing eﬀective tax rates
on capital, labor and consumption for the EU 25 countries following the methodology
of Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994). These measures have not been calculated
previously for the 25 EU countries based on one consistent data set.2 We then
compare the newly calculated measure with the commissions’ eﬀective tax rates for
the jointly available 15 EU countries and show that the measures are similar. The
new measure is also compared to other measures of tax burden.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section discusses
the concept of eﬀective tax rates. Section 3 discusses the computation of eﬀective tax
rates with Eurostat data and presents the tax rates and some summary information.
Section 4 compares the newly computed data to other available tax measures. The
last section concludes.
1Jacobs, Spengel, Finkenzeller, and Roche (2004) present some of these data for the 10 new
member states and Germany, Devereux, Griﬃth, and Klemm (2002) present data for most of
the EU 15 countries. The deﬁnitions of the two measures diﬀer however, so that they are not
comparable.
2European Commission - DG Taxation and Customs Union (2004) present eﬀective tax rates
for the old EU countries based on a slightly diﬀerent deﬁnition, however not for the 10 new member
states.4
2 Eﬀective Tax Rates in Macroeconomics
The measurement of tax burdens at the macroeconomic level faces several problems.
The complexity and variety of tax deductions and exemptions make it diﬃcult to
conclude from tax rates to actual tax burdens. Most aggregate revenue data do not
themselves correspond to the theoretical concepts of tax burdens on consumption,
labor and capital. Diﬀerent taxes refer to the same tax base, e.g., social security
payments and income taxes aﬀect labor income. Finally, tax payments can be shifted
inter-temporally, possibly distorting the actual tax burden.
In a seminal paper, Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) develop a method to com-
pute eﬀective ex-post macroeconomic tax rates with national account data. Their
method yields estimates of eﬀective tax rates on factor incomes and consumption
consistent with the tax distortions faced by a representative agent. The method has
subsequently been applied in several publications, e.g., Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti,
and Asea (1997) and Mendoza and Tesar (2005).
In particular, Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) (MRT) assume that the econ-
omy consists of three goods, labor, capital and a consumption good, for which pre-
and post-tax prices exist. The ad valorem tax rate is the diﬀerence in the post- and





Since data on these prices are not directly available, the ad valorem tax rate can be
approximated by the product of prices and quantities, using revenue statistics and





The tax wedge on consumption can be calculated as:
τc =
Tc
C + G − GW − Tc
, (3)
where Tc is the payment of taxes on goods and services and excise taxes, as given
by national revenue statistics. C + G is private and government ﬁnal consumption
expenditure, GW is the compensation of government employees.3 Mendoza, Razin,
and Tesar (1994) provide the corresponding keys to the variables in the OECD
statistics.
3GW needs to be deducted, as the government sector only pays indirect taxes on the purchase
of goods and nonfactor services.5
The tax wedge on labor income is calculated with one intermediate step. It is
assumed that all household income is taxed with the same rate. This household’s





where Th is the tax payment by households on income, proﬁts, and capital gains,
W are wages and salaries, OSP are operating surpluses of private unincorporated
enterprises and entrepreneurial income. This average tax rate of households is used
in the computation of the eﬀective labor tax rate:
τl =
τhW + SSCt + Tpw
W + SSCe , (5)
where SSCt are total social security contributions, SSCe are employer’s contribution
to social security and Tpw are taxes on payroll and workforce.
The tax wedge on capital income is deﬁned by
τk =
τhOSP + T corp + Timprop
OS
, (6)
where T corp are taxes on income, proﬁts, and capital gains of corporations, Timprop
are taxes on immovable property and taxes on ﬁnancial and capital transactions.
Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) employ OECD data and codes to compute
these tax wedges. Since the OECD does not provide data for all EU countries, in
the next section we approximate the OECD data with data provided by Eurostat.
3 Eﬀective Tax Rates in the EU 25
3.1 Calculation of eﬀective tax rates
To compute the eﬀective average tax rate on consumption, we divide value added
type taxes by private and government ﬁnal consumption expenditure corrected for
the payment of value added type taxes. More precisely, the eﬀective tax rate on
consumption is calculated as4:
τc =
D211 + D212 + D214 + D29
P31 S14 + P3 S13 − D1 S13 − (D211 + D212 + D214 + D29)
(7)
The thus calculated eﬀective tax rates on consumption are given in the following
Table 1. It can be debated whether ”other taxes on production (d29)” should
4The codes for the variables are detailed in Table 6 in the appendix.6
be included in the calculation of this eﬀective tax rate. We include these taxes,
since they contribute to the price wedge between producer and consumer prices.
Alternatively, some of these taxes could be classiﬁed as lump-sum taxes on capital.
However, since we aim to calculate the tax wedge on capital income, we add d29
to the indirect taxes.5
To compute the eﬀective tax rates on capital and labor income, we ﬁrst have to





where the personal income tax base PITB (pre-tax household income) is calculated
as the total compensation of employees and the net operating surplus in the economy
less actual social security contributions and taxes on income, proﬁts, and capital
gains of corporations.
PITB = D1 + B2n − D611 − D51B − D51C2 − D29 (9)
The resulting tax rate is given in Table 2.
The eﬀective average tax rate on labor income can then be calculated as:
τl =
τhD11 + D611 + D29C
D11 + D6111
(10)
The labor income tax rate is the ratio of the average tax rate applied to wages and
salaries plus the actual social contributions divided by the tax base, which are the
wages and salaries plus the employers’ social contribution. In this deﬁnition, we also
include taxes on the total wage bill and payroll taxes.6
5Omitting d29 altogether gives signiﬁcantly lower eﬀective tax rates. The country ordering
changes only little with a Spearman rank correlation coeﬃcient of around 0.9 in most years.
6This last category could be omitted, since these taxes are not directly linked to the individual
labor tax wedge. This does not change the results signiﬁcantly.7
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Author’s calculation, Eurostat data, * indicates that data are taken from
Equation 12.8




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Author’s calculation, Eurostat data, * indicates that rates are computed from
Equation 149



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source:Author’s calculation, Eurostat data, * indicates that rates are computed from
Equation 1510
Finally, the eﬀective capital income tax can be computed from
τk =
τh(B2n − D611 − D51B − D51C2 − D29) + D51B + D51C + D6113
B2n
(11)
This equation directly follows MRT in assuming that the whole income of self
employed is capital income. Therefore, we also added the social contributions
of self employed (D6113) in the denominator. Also, this deﬁnition takes as a
basis the net operating surplus, since consumption of ﬁxed capital is not taxed
B2n = B2g + B3G − K1. The results for this measure are presented in Table 4.11





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source:Author’s calculation, Eurostat data, * indicates that rates are computed from
Equation 1712
3.2 Discussion of the eﬀective tax rates
The general pattern of taxation is broadly consistent with the literature. The eﬀec-
tive tax burden on all three goods, consumption, labor and capital is higher in the
EU 15 than the 10 NMS. In particular, the tax wedge on labor diﬀers by 10 percent-
age points, while for consumption and capital the diﬀerence is roughly 5 percentage
points. The average eﬀective tax burdens do not change much in the period 1998 to
Table 5: Comparing the tax burden on consumption, labor, and capital in the EU15
and 10 NMS.
10 NMS EU15
tax on... Obs Mean Obs Mean
consumption 8 0.248 15 0.298
1998 labor 6 0.348 13 0.469
capital 6 0.151 13 0.214
consumption 10 0.255 15 0.306
2000 labor 6 0.374 12 0.481
capital 5 0.138 12 0.230
consumption 10 0.252 15 0.300
2002 labor 4 0.375 12 0.472
capital 6 0.143 12 0.204
Source: Author’s calculation based on Eurostat data
2002. We observe a slight increase in the eﬀective tax on capital from 1998 to 2000
which decreases again in 2002 in the old EU countries. Taxes on capital slightly
decrease in the 10 NMS.
The cross country standard deviation of eﬀective tax burdens on capital has
slightly increased from 6.6 to 7.1, while the standard deviation of top statutory tax
rates taken from European Commission - DG Taxation and Customs Union (2004)
has fallen from 8.4 to 6.6 together with a reduction in the mean of the top corporate
tax rate. We take this as evidence, that tax competition has exercised a downward
pressure on tax rate on corporate income together with a harmonization of rates.
For the eﬀective tax burden, this eﬀect is not visible. This implies that the tax bases
have probably widened.13
4 Comparing Diﬀerent Tax Measures
In this section, we compare our newly computed eﬀective measures on capital, labor
and consumption with diﬀerent measures available in the literature. In a ﬁrst step,
we take other eﬀective tax measures. We then compare our measure of the capital
income tax wedge with the corporate tax rates.
4.1 The eﬀective tax measures by the EU commission and
our measure
To assess the general validity of the MRT approach in the calculation of the eﬀective
average tax rate, we compare our results with the eﬀective average tax rate of the EU
commission for those countries, for which both data are available. The eﬀective tax
rate on capital income computed with the MRT approach is highly correlated with
the eﬀective tax rates computed by the European commission (European Commis-
sion - DG Taxation and Customs Union 2004). We compute a country correlation
coeﬃcient above 0.7 for all EU 15 countries except BE, IE, NL, SE; for many coun-
tries the correlation is above 0.98. This results directly from the fact that similar
deﬁnitions are used in the computation of this measure.7
Figure 1 plots the commission’s and our estimate of the tax wedge on capi-
tal income. While a positive linear relationship between the two measures can be
observed, there is some variation between the two measures due to diﬀerences in
deﬁnition.
Concerning the eﬀective tax on labor, the commission’s measure and our measure
closely co-move, as can be seen in Figure 2. A linear regression of our measure on
the oﬃcial measure yields an R2 = 0.69 and a coeﬃcient of 1 for the ﬁxed eﬀects
regression. The two slightly diﬀerent ways of computing eﬀective average tax rates
are thus very similar. We are therefore conﬁdent, that our measure for the enlarged
EU is a reasonable measure of eﬀective average tax rates.
Similarly, the comparison of our measure and the Commission’s measure of the
eﬀective tax on consumption reveals a high similarity (Figure 3). The R2 = 0.64
is also high. Overall, our measures are thus comparable to the eﬀective tax burden
computed by the European Commission.
7We deﬁne the denominator diﬀerently from the Commission and in line with MRT. The nom-
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Commission’s measure
Our measure Fitted values
Effective tax on capital
Figure 1: Comparison of the eﬀective tax rate on capital as computed by the EU
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Commission’s measure
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Effective tax on labor
Figure 2: Comparison of the eﬀective tax rate on labor as computed by the Com-
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Figure 3: Comparison of the eﬀective tax rate on consumption as computed by the
Commission with our measure according to MRT for the EU 15 countries.16
4.2 Eﬀective tax wedge on capital income and the eﬀective
ex-ante measures by Devereux et al
Comparing our ex-post eﬀective average measure of the tax wedge on capital with
the eﬀective marginal tax rate as computed by Devereux, Griﬃth, and Klemm (2002)
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EMTR, ex−ante
Ex−post Fitted values
Effective ex−ante marginal and ex−post tax on capital
Figure 4: Comparison of the eﬀective tax rate on capital with the Devereux et al
(2002) eﬀective marginal measure for the EU 15 countries.
and our measure is given in Figure 5. For both measures, the eﬀective marginal and
the eﬀective average ex-ante tax levied on income from investment (computed by
Devereux, Griﬃth, and Klemm (2002)), no signiﬁcant correlation can be found to a













































.1 .2 .3 .4 .5
EATR, ex−ante
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Effective ex−ante average and ex−post tax on capital
Figure 5: Comparison of the eﬀective tax rate on capital with the Devereux et al
(2002) eﬀective average measure for the EU 15 countries.18
4.3 Eﬀective tax measures and other tax measures
The literature on the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on economic growth employs as a promi-
nent measure the total government intervention in the economy. This is measured
by the total tax burden inclusive of social security in percent of GDP. As Figure
6 shows this measure is highly correlated with the eﬀective tax burden on labor.
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Total tax including social security in percent of GDP
Effective tax rate on labor Fitted values
Labor and total tax burden
Figure 6: Comparison of the eﬀective tax rate on labor according to the measure
computed according to the methodology of MRT with the total tax burden in percent
of GDP for the EU 25 countries.
burden measured in percent of GDP (Figure 7). Implicit taxes on capital, on the
other hand, have little in common with the total tax burden in percent of GDP
as Figure 8 shows. This probably indicates that the major sources of government
revenue in the discussed EU countries come from taxing labor and consumption.
The variation in the implicit tax burden on capital has on the other hand little in
common with the overall tax burden on the economy.
This raises the question, whether labor and consumption taxes are used as sup-
plementary revenue sources or substitutes. Figure 9 shows the relationship between
the two measures, which is positive. This means that high labor tax countries have
a tendency to also heavily tax consumption. This result is conﬁrmed by a linear
regression with a statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of 0 .4. However, there is a lot of
unexplained variation as shown by an R2 of 0.18, which implies that some countries
might impose a heavy tax burden on labor while leaving consumption tax wedges







































20 30 40 50 60
Total tax including social security in percent of GDP
Effective tax on consumption Fitted values
Consumption and total tax burden
Figure 7: Comparison of the eﬀective tax rate on consumption according to the
measure computed according to the methodology of MRT with the total tax burden





































20 30 40 50 60
Total tax including social security in percent of GDP
Effective tax on capital Fitted values
Capital and total tax burden
Figure 8: Comparison of the eﬀective tax rate on capital according to the MRT
measure computed by the author with the total tax burden in percent of GDP for
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Effective tax on labor and on consumption
Figure 9: Comparison of the eﬀective tax rate on labor with the eﬀective tax rate
on consumption for the EU 25 countries.21
Finally, we would like to address the question, whether high eﬀective tax rates on
capital are found in countries with high coporate tax rates. Figure 10 reveals that
while the eﬀective tax rate on capital income is not well explained by the top statu-
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top statutory tax rate on corporate income
effective tax on capital Fitted values
Effective tax on capital and the top statutory tax
Figure 10: Comparison of the eﬀective tax rate on capital according to the MRT
measure computed by the author with the top statutory tax rate on corporate
income.
low degree of explained variance might result from the possibility of signiﬁcant tax
exemptions. It also reﬂects the fact, that capital income is only partly generated in
corporations, unincorporated partnerships are not taxed with the corporate income
tax. Nevertheless, there appears to be a connection between the two measures.22
5 Conclusions
This paper computes eﬀective tax rates on consumption, labor, and capital for 25
EU countries based on Eurostat data. These eﬀective tax rates on factor income
and consumption are consistent with the tax distortion faced by a representative
agent in a general equilibrium framework (Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar 1994). They
are well suited for macroeconomic models and broad cross-country comparisons. In
particular, they are based on coherent national accounts deﬁnitions and take into
account all existing exemption, tax credits and deductions. However, as they are
calculated from macroeconomic data, they provide only limited information on the
actual tax burdens of individual corporations or households.
Our newly computed eﬀective tax rates are in line with the Commission’s ﬁgures
for the EU 15 taken from European Commission - DG Taxation and Customs Union
(2004). We show that eﬀective tax rates in the 10 new member states of the EU
are on average 10 percentage points lower on labor, and 5 percentage points lower
on capital and consumption. There is no tendency of convergence in eﬀective tax
burdens on capital, a result in line with Mendoza and Tesar (2005). However, top
statutory tax rates on corporate income converge. Countries with large tax wedges
on labor and consumption have large overall tax to GDP burdens, while the tax
wedge on capital is only weakly related to the total tax burden. There is a tendency
of using taxes on labor and consumption together in the EU and not one instead of
the other.23
References
Buettner, T., and M. Ruf (2004): “Tax Incentives and the Location of FDI:
Evidence from a Panel of German Multinationals,” ZEW working paper.
Devereux, M. P., and R. Griffith (2003): “Evaluating Tax Policy for Location
Decisions,” International Tax and Public Finance, 10 (2), 107–26.
Devereux, M. P., R. Griffith, and A. Klemm (2002): “Corporate Income
Tax Reform and International Tax Competition,” Economic Policy, 02, 451–495.
Easterly, W., and S. Rebelo (1993): “Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth, An
Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 32, 417–458.
ESA (1995): COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2223/96 of 25 June 1996 on the
European System of National and Regional Accounts in the Community.
European Commission - DG Taxation and Customs Union (2004): Struc-
tures of the Taxation Systems in the European Union. European Commission,
Brussels.
Jacobs, O. H., C. Spengel, M. Finkenzeller, and M. Roche (2004): Com-
pany Taxation in the New EU Member States. Ernst and Young, ZEW.
Kneller, R., M. Bleaney, and N. Gemmel (1999): “Fiscal Policy and Growth:
Evidence from OECD Countries,” Journal of Public Economics, 74, 171–190.
Mendoza, E. G., G. Milesi-Ferretti, and P. Asea (1997): “On the Eﬀec-
tiveness of Tax Policy in Altering Long-Run Growth: Harberger’s Superneutrality
Conjecture,” Journal of Public Economics, 66, 99–126.
Mendoza, E. G., A. Razin, and L. L. Tesar (1994): “Eﬀective Tax Rates in
Macroeconomics, Cross-Country Estimates of Tax Rates on Factor Incomes and
Consumption,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 34, 297–323.
Mendoza, E. G., and L. L. Tesar (2005): “Why Hasn’t Tax Competition
Triggered a Race to the Bottom? Some Quantitative Lessons from the EU,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 52, 163–204.24
6 Appendix
6.1 Deﬁnitions
Table 6: ESA codes for variables used
B2g+B3G gross operating surplus and gross mixed income, total economy
B2n net operating surplus in the economy, not available online
K1 capital consumption at current prices, total economy, UKCT
= UKCT from AMECO database
D1 compensation of employees, total economy
D1 S13 compensation of employees, general government
D11 wages and salaries
D2 taxes on production and imports
D211 value added type taxes
D212 taxes and duties on imports excluding VAT
D214 taxes on products, except VAT and import taxes
D214C taxes on ﬁnancial and capital transactions,
payable on the purchase or sale of non-ﬁnancial and ﬁnancial assets
D29 other taxes on production
D29A other taxes on production,
taxes on the ownership or use of land, buildings, or other structures utilized
by enterprises in production
D29B other taxes on production,
taxes on the use of ﬁxed assets (vehicles, machinery, equipment) for production
D29C other taxes on production, taxes on the total wage bill and payroll taxes
D51A+D51C1 taxes on income, proﬁts, and capital gains of individuals
D51B+D51C2 taxes on income, proﬁts, and capital gains of corporations
D611 actual social contributions received, general government
D611 social contributions by self- and non-employed persons
D6111 employers’ actual social contribution
P3 S13 government ﬁnal consumption expenditure
P31 S14 private ﬁnal consumption expenditure
Source: ESA (1995)25
6.2 Implicit tax rate on consumption
The eﬀective tax rate on consumption according to Equation 7 was presented above.
Since for some countries, data availability was limited, we propose a broader mea-
sure. This measure of the eﬀective tax rate on consumption is
τc =
D2
P31 S14 + P3 S13 − D1 S13 − D2
(12)
It diﬀers only slightly from the ﬁrst measure, the results are reported below in Table
8. The mean absolute deviation between the two measures is 0.011 for the common
observations. The Spearman rank correlation is above 0.95 in all years.26































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source:Author’s calculation, Eurostat data27















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source:Author’s calculation, Eurostat data28
6.3 Household’s average income tax









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source:Author’s calculation, Eurostat data
Since the measure for the household average income has quite a lot of missing
values, we calculate an approximate measure. Instead of D51A + D51C1, we only
take D51A from the AMECO database. D51B + D51C2 is approximated with
D51B from the AMECO database, where A indicates AMECO as a data source.
For those countries, for which both data are available, we compared the diﬀerence
in magnitude, which is minor.
PITB
A = D1 + B2n − D611 − D51B






The correlation of the two measures of household’s average tax rates is very high at
around 0.9 for those countries, for which both measures are available.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source:Author’s calculation, Eurostat data30
6.4 Implicit tax rate on labor

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source:Author’s calculation, Eurostat data
Since the eﬀective tax rate on labor could not be computed for several coun-
tries because of missing observation, we compute an approximate eﬀective tax rate





h ∗ D11 + D611
D11 + D6111
(15)
The correlation between this measure and the measure calculated from Equation
10 is 0.98 for those countries for which both observations are available. Spearman
rank correlation gives a ρ greater 0.9 for most years. The mean absolute deviation31
between the two measures of eﬀective tax on labor is 0.017 for the 106 available joint
observations. We are therefore conﬁdent, that the simpliﬁed measure captures the
the eﬀective/ eﬀective tax rate on labor accurately.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source:Author’s calculation, Eurostat data32
6.5 Implicit tax on capital














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source:Author’s calculation, Eurostat data
tk =
τh ∗ (PITB − D1) + D51B D51C + D29A + D29B + D214C
B2n
(16)
To account for missing observations of especially Germany, we compute the fol-





h ∗ (PITBA − D1) + D51BA + D6113
B2n
(17)
This measure is highly correlated with the one according to 11, with a Spearman
rank correlation greater 0.9 for most years. The mean absolute deviation is 0.018.33























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Author’s calculation, Eurostat data
We are therefore conﬁdent, that the computed tax rate is robust to the particular
speciﬁcation.34





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Author’s calculation, Eurostat data2008
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